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Abstract 
This report offers an overview of crowdfunding using the current literature on the topic.  It explains how crowdfunding campaigns and 
crowdfunding platforms function.  It next explains how start-ups can benefit from crowdfunding: start-ups can gain access to finance not 
otherwise available; but crowdfunding can also lend legitimacy to projects and can help these projects access traditional financing.  This 
report also discusses potential drawbacks, such as the risk that crowdfunding might lead entrepreneurs to disclosure requirements that 
destroy the value of their ideas and might expose investors to fraud, incompetent managers, and investment lock-ins.  Finally, this report 
highlights how current equity crowdfunding regulations have regulated platforms, participating crowds, and fundraising companies.  We 
conclude by offering further avenues of investigation to assess how crowdfunding and these regulations will impact the funding of ICT 
innovations. 
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Preface 
This report was prepared in the context of the three-year research project on European innovation 
policies for the digital shift (Euripidis) jointly launched in 2013 by the Joint Research Centre-
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) and the Directorate-General (DG) for 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology of the European Commission in order to 
improve understanding of innovation in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector 
and of ICT-enabled innovation in the rest of the economy (2). 
The purpose of the Euripidis project is to provide evidence-based support to the policies, 
instruments and measurement needs of DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology for 
enhancing ICT innovation in Europe, in the context of the Digital Agenda for Europe and of the ICT 
priority of Horizon 2020. It focuses on the improvement of the transfer of best research ideas to 
the market. 
Euripidis aims are: 
1. to better understand how ICT innovation works, at the level of actors such as firms, and 
also of the ICT ‘innovation system’ in the EU; 
2. to assess the EU’s current ICT innovation performance, by attempting to measure ICT 
innovation in Europe and measuring the impact of existing policies and instruments (such as 
the seventh framework programme (FP7) and Horizon 2020); and 
3. to explore and suggest how policymakers could make ICT innovation in the EU work better. 
The present report contributes to point 1 by looking at one barrier to ICT innovation: financing. This 
report looks at how crowdfunding can be used to encourage the financing of ICT innovation.
                                                        
(2) For more information, see the project website: 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/ISG/EURIPIDIS/EURIPIDIS.index.html  
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Executive summary 
As part of the European innovation policies for the digital shift (Euripidis) project, a joint project 
between the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) and DG Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology, we investigate the barriers to ICT-enabled innovation. In 
previous surveys, entrepreneurs and innovators have complained that access to finance was one of 
the most pressing issues for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as start-ups. Thus, 
we are investigating how to address financing as a barrier to ICT-enabled innovation. 
We therefore turned our attention to sources of financing beyond the traditional form of financing. 
Traditional methods of financing usually come from funds from friends and family, bank loans, 
business angel and venture investments. We identified crowdfunding as a potential way to go 
beyond the traditional methods of financing businesses and innovation and as a potential way to 
address this barrier to innovation. 
This report offers an overview of crowdfunding using the current literature on the topic. It explains 
how crowdfunding campaigns and platforms function. Crowdfunding is the raising of small funds 
from a large number of individuals. In its current form, crowdfunding involves intermediaries, which 
are called funding portals. These funding portals are usually web-based. 
Four declinations of crowdfunding exist: donation crowdfunding involves contributors giving 
(altruistically) money to a campaign and getting in return, at most, an acknowledgment; reward 
crowdfunding involves contributors giving to a campaign and getting in return a product or a 
service; lending crowdfunding involves investors offering a loan to a campaign and getting back in 
return their capital plus interest; and equity crowdfunding involves investors buying stakes in a 
company and getting in return company stocks. 
Innovators or entrepreneurs can use a crowdfunding platform, i.e. a web-based funding portal, to 
campaign and raise funds from a broad crowd including their social networks and the network of 
the portal. Entrepreneurs enjoy the obvious benefits of being able to access new funds that might 
not be otherwise available but they also enjoy non-pecuniary benefits such as feedback about their 
idea from the crowd and access to the skillset of contributors, who are often willing to lend a hand. 
The crowd enjoys access to products before they become widely available and become engaged 
and involved in the production process. 
Crowdfunding does not come without its drawbacks. Entrepreneurs must disclose information, which 
may affect the value of their companies and they may not receive funding because they fail to 
send the correct signals (instead of failing because they do not have a valuable idea). The crowd is 
also exposed to potential fraudulent schemes, since most transactions are conducted over the 
Internet. 
After discussing these benefits and drawbacks of crowdfunding for entrepreneurs and investors, the 
report focuses on equity crowdfunding because they involve higher funds: donations/reward 
campaigns usually involve campaign raising under €20 000, on average; lending campaigns usually 
involves under €100 000, on average; and equity crowdfunding usually involves over €300 000, on 
average. Equity crowdfunding also usually involves higher risks: donation/reward campaigns have 
traditional consumer law remedies at their disposal; lending campaigns involve individuals with a 
track record; and equity campaigns involve start-ups, which fail frequently. Equity crowdfunding, 
hence, is part of the broader ecosystem of financing start-ups and innovation. 
Consequently, this report highlights the current equity crowdfunding regulations in the European 
Union as of 1 October 2014. Even without new regulations, equity crowdfunding has emerged in 
Europe. Yet Italy, the United Kingdom, and France have adopted new regulations. The report 
compares these regulations to the proposed regulation in the United States of America, where the 
majority of worldwide crowdfunding takes place. 
All the new regulations have required that platforms be licensed. All the new regulations have 
limited companies to fundraise a specific amount over a 12-month period. However, each regulation 
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has set different limits: Italy and the United Kingdom have a €5 million limit; France has a €1 
million limit; and the USA has a $1 million limit. The United Kingdom and the USA have limited how 
much each non-qualified investor may invest to 10 % of their net assets (with some other 
thresholds depending on income/assets in the USA) whereas in Italy and in France, investors may 
invest at will. However, Italy has set further limits requiring the fundraising company to be a small 
and young innovative start-up and requiring 5 % of the funds to come from professional investors. 
This diversity of regulations opens the door to potential regulatory arbitrage: currently, citizens of 
one European Union Member State may invest in another Member State. In comparison, the United 
States has limited regulatory arbitrage between its states. In the EU, harmonisation may offer some 
advantages to avoid a concentration of funds and crowdfunding. This equity crowdfunding 
phenomenon remains new and monitoring the effect of the current regulations may shed light on 
further benefits and drawbacks of crowdfunding. This report concludes by offering further avenues 
of investigation to assess how crowdfunding and these regulations will impact the funding of ICT 
innovations. 
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1. Introduction 
The European innovation policies for the digital shift (Euripidis) project, a joint project between the 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) and the Directorate-General (DG) for 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology, investigates the barriers to information and 
communication technology (ICT) innovation. Among these barriers, we pay special attention to the 
financial barriers that negatively impact innovative companies and to the same extent ICT 
innovation. 
Entrepreneurs cite ‘access to finance’ as the second most pressing problem for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (3). Start-ups face the same financing problems as SMEs (4). The 
financial crisis has made this fund shortage even more problematic (5). Crowdfunding may offer an 
alternative method of funding for SMEs and start-ups (6), and a stop-gap solution (7). 
SME and start-up entrepreneurs can finance their company internally or externally. An 
entrepreneur finances his/her company internally when he/she uses retained earnings and personal 
equity. The majority of SMEs, however, do not use internal funds and instead prefer external 
financing (8). Start-up entrepreneurs have limited options because they do not have retained 
earnings, and if they do not have personal equity either, they must turn to external financing. 
External financing takes multiple forms, for instance equity raised from external sources, 
bank loans, bank overdrafts, leasing, and trade credits. The most common external funding methods 
are borrowing funds from friends and family, loans from banks, investments from business angels 
or venture capitalists, and funds raised through crowdfunding campaigns (9). All these types of 
external financing have their benefits and shortcomings. 
First, friends and family lend funds to start businesses but also throughout the life of most 
SMEs (10). Next to personal equity, friends and family remain the most commonly tapped source of 
start-up financing (11). Loans from friends and family have benefits: they do not suffer from the 
same information asymmetry as bank loans because friends and family know the entrepreneurs, 
their skills and experience; these entrepreneurs may be more candid about their business; and 
friends and family may create more social pressure on entrepreneurs relative to other forms of 
external financing and make the business succeed (12). Yet entrepreneurs who exclusively borrow 
from friends and family to start their business remain a minority (13). These loans require wealthy 
relatives and hence may generate a class bias. 
                                                        
(3) According to a recent joint European Commission and European Central Bank report, 15 % of 
entrepreneurs questioned cite access to finance as a problem behind finding customers, which was cited 
in 22 % of the answers (Ipsos Mori, 2013) (Henceforth ‘Joint Report’). 
(4) (Moncada-Paternò-Castello, Vezzani, Hervás, & Montresor, 2014). 
(5) (Moncada-Paternò-Castello, Vezzani, Hervás, & Montresor, 2014). 
(6) This report uses SMEs and start-ups as proxy for innovative companies because SMEs represents 99 % 
of all companies and they are ‘[c]ritical to such a culture of innovation’ (European Commission, 2000). 
(7) Collins & Pierrakis (2012) argue that crowdfunding will help fill the financing gap but also help finance 
start-ups that present returns which are too low to attract venture capitalists and risks which are too 
high for bank loans. 
(8) The Joint Report quotes 74 % of SMEs did not use internal financing in the last six months. 
(9) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012). 
(10) The Joint Report quotes that 15 % of SMEs have used ‘a loan from related companies, shareholders, 
family or friends’ in the last six months and 17 % of SMEs did not but have done so in the past. 
(11) Colombo & Grilli (2007) find that 97.9 % of 386 Italian new technology-based start-ups use personal 
capital (savings or family/friends’ funds), 22 % resorted to banks loans, while 3.9 % received private 
equity (business angels and venture capitalists). Robb & Robinson (2012) find that 77.9 % of 3 972 US 
start-ups used owner equity, 12.1 % used friends’ and family loans, 5.2 % received outside equity 
investment, 36.2 % used any type of loans from banks (includes credit cards, bank lines, and personal 
bank loans).  
(12) Åstebro & Bernhardt (2003) find that having a loan from either friends, family, spouse, former owner, or 
home mortgage increases the probability of a business survival four years later in a statistically 
significant way, pp. 312–313. 
(13) In 1987, between 9.8 % and 15.8 % of US start-ups used family loans (Åstebro & Bernhardt, 2003). 
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Second, bank loans can help entrepreneurs start their business (14). However, banks can be 
reluctant to provide start-up entrepreneurs with extensive loans because these entrepreneurs often 
lack the track record, the collateral, and they venture in risky business (15). These limited bank loans 
force entrepreneurs to complement their funds from other sources if they are to reach an optimal 
size for their business (16). 
Third, business angels and venture capitalists can also help finance SMEs and start-ups (17). 
Business angels may provide entrepreneurs with funds. Business angels are often parts of networks 
and browse projects on websites (18). While data are often limited about the funds provided, they 
often provide limited funds estimated between €100 000 and €200 000 (19) but have a positive 
impact upon the survival of companies (20). Venture capitalists focus on larger start-ups in specific 
sectors of the economy (21). They often require high returns for the high risk of investing in private 
equity companies (22). Venture capitalists also need a way to cash in on their investment that can 
provide these high returns (23). 
                                                        
(14) Colombo & Grilli (2007) find that 22 % of new Italian technology-based start-ups used a bank loan. This 
rate may be culture-related and varies over time. Åstebro & Bernhardt (2003) find that between 16 % 
and 22.4 % of US start-ups in 1987 used bank loans; more recently, Robb & Robinson (2012) find that 
16 % of start-ups used a bank loan and 6 % used a personal bank loan in 2004. Some banks such as  
(15) (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). 
(16) Colombo & Grilli (2005) find that access to external financing beside bank loans has statistically 
significant positive effects upon the the size of start-ups a year after its incorporation. One recent 
unpublished study (Brown, Degryse, Höwer, & Penas) shows that German start-ups that use access loan 
banks have more funds than start-ups that do not; that German high-tech start-ups are less likely to 
have access to bank loans than low-tech firms — this problem worsens with the company’s age; and 
that local banks are more likely to lend to companies than large conglomerates for high-tech companies. 
A Barclays report, written by The Economist Intelligence Unit, states that seed stage will remain the 
realm of social loans because banks focus on whether entrepreneurs ‘can pay back’ and if not, ‘what 
assests can be claimed in its stead.’ (The Economist, Intelligence Unit, 2014, p. 18). Yet this report 
suggests alternative methods to finance start-ups while other banks have programmes that target start-
ups specifically, e.g. the Bank of Ireland developed a fund that specialises in offering seed and early 
stage funds (http://businessbanking.bankofireland.com/credit/business-loans/seed-and-early-stage-fund/ 
(last visited 28 August 2014). 
(17) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012) Even though they function in similar ways, they are often distinguished 
because of the size of their contributions: business angels bring more capital than friends and family yet 
less than venture capitalists. Start-ups that receive private equity injection from investors are larger, on 
average, than their counterparts financed through family/friends or bank loans. Colombo & Grilli (2007) 
find that start-ups that use personal capital have a mean starting capital of €107 000, whereas start-
ups that use private equity have a mean starting capital of €274 500. 
(18) ‘[D]eals tend to find business angels rather than angels seeking out businesses’ (Collins & Pierrakis, 
2012, p. 26). 
(19) A report prepared for the European Commission estimates that there are about 170 000 to 240 000 
business angels in Europe; each angel provides between €18 000 to over €150 000; the total amount 
provided by angels in Europe is about €660 million; each funded firm receives between €100 000 and 
€200 000. This means that in Europe, between 3 300 and 6 600 firms receive business angel funds 
(Centre for Stategy & Evaluation Services, 2012). 
(20) (Kerr, Lerner, & Schoar, A Regression Discontinuity Analysis) found that because business angels tend to 
be more hands-on, they increase the likelihood of company survival but do not impact whether 
companies are more likely to gain access to other sources of financing. 
(21) Some venture capital funds specialise in seed-stage start-ups such as Accel Partners 
(http://www.accel.com/) and Beringea (http://www.beringea.com/) — both with operations in the United 
Kingdom. These venture funds provide up to €25 million and €10 million respectively and specialise in 
ICT and biotechnology. 
(22) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 29). Bank debt is negatively correlated to venture capital funding, but 
venture capital-backed firms have much higher growth rates than debt-backed young innovative firms 
on the German Neuer Market (Hall, 2010). ‘Overall, 19.1 percent of all first-round investments earn a 
value multiple of five or more, whereas 43.7 percent return nothing’ (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, p. 144). 
(23) (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2010). By definition, venture capital funds do not invest in public companies and 
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Finally, crowdfunding, as a form of microfinance, has been around for years; however, the 
emergence of the Internet has broadened its use (24). Unlike venture capital, crowdfunding raises 
small amounts from a large number of investors instead of a large amount from a few investors. 
Crowdfunding can help entrepreneurs fund one product or a whole company. However, the 
crowdfunding fees can be large, the regulation unclear and burdensome, and the payoff can be 
insufficient for certain investors (25). These benefits and drawbacks are discussed in more detail 
below. 
In spite of these shortcomings, crowdfunding has widely spread (26). The large majority of 
crowdfunding platforms are found in the USA and Europe (27). Crowdfunding carries hope of helping 
bridge the financing gap between (small) loans from friends, family, and banks and (large) 
investments from venture capitalists (28). 
The European Commission has been exploring crowdfunding. The Commission recently 
ended a consultation period (29) and released a communication on crowdfunding in March 2014 (30). 
This communication touches upon the types of crowdfunding, its shortcomings, and the applicable 
regulations. It identifies concerns that consultation respondents flagged as important — including 
regulation obscurities for cross-border transactions, the tax treatment of contributions among 
others. 
This report explores the crowdfunding literature to build upon two points that this 
communication makes. First, the communication highlights that crowdfunding has the ‘potential … 
to complement traditional sources of finance.’ (31) Second, the communication mentions that 
crowdfunding can help start-ups along the funding escalator where ‘[c]rowdfunding can be followed 
by other forms of financing, such as bank financing, angel or venture capital, or an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO).’ (32) This report investigates both the complementarity and escalator arguments. Both 
arguments have value because crowdfunding is flexible enough to allow fundraisers to fit the 
campaign to their financial needs; at the same time, as shown by existing laws in France, Italy, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘23.3 percent of all first-round investments eventually had an IPO’ (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, p. 144).  
(24) (Hemer, 2011) 
(25) Business angels and venture capitalists may not partake in crowdfunding because of the fees and the 
lack of personal contact — particularly if they want to take part in the business process.  
(26) Crowdsourcing.org has 939 sites listed in its directory as of 8 January 2014 up from 452 in April 2012; 
Massolution reports that the crowdfunding industry has grown worldwide from $530 million in 2009 to 
$2.8 billion in 2012; Kickstarter reported the website helped raise $27 million in 2010 to $529 million in 
2014 (Kickstarter.com, 2014) (Kickstarter.com, 2012) (Kickstarter.com, 2013)  (Kickstarter.com, 2015). 
(27) ‘85 % of the crowdfunding platforms are founded in the USA and Europe, and 15 % in the rest of the 
world with Brazil (20 platforms), Canada (12) and Australia (7) ranking in the highest positions’ (Ramos, 
Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms., 
2014). 
(28) Collins & Pierrakis (2012) argue that crowdfunding will help bridge the financing gap but also help 
finance start-ups that present returns too low to attract venture capitalist but risk too high for bank 
loans (p. 17). 
(29) From 3 October 2013 to 31 December 2013, the European Commission launched a consultation to 
explore the added value of potential EU action entitled ‘The consultation by the European Commission on 
crowdfunding in the EU — Exploring the added value of potential EU action’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf 
(last visited 8 April 2014). A summary of responses is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/crowdfunding/docs/summary-of-
responses_en.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?userstate=DisplayPublishedResults&form=CROWDFUND
ING&lang=en (last visited 8 April 2014). 
(30) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/crowdfunding/140327-communication_en.pdf (last 
visited 8 April 2014). 
(31) (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economica 
nd Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2014, pp. 2, 9). 
(32) (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economica 
nd Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2014, pp. 2, 9). 
9 
United Kingdom, and the USA, regulations can influence how crowdfunding is used as a complement 
to traditional financing or as escalator financing. 
This report uses the current literature to draw future research questions on how 
crowdfunding can help entrepreneurs, in ICT-enabled fields, finance their innovations and overcome 
the financial barriers to innovation (33). The first section presents the main types of crowdfunding 
and how they function. The second section focuses on the benefits and risks associated with 
crowdfunding. The third section investigates the crowdfunding-specific legislations in France, Italy, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States and how these different countries have attempted to 
counterbalance the shortcomings of crowdfunding. 
 
2. Describing the functioning of crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding, for the purpose of this report, is defined as the collecting of resources (funds, 
money, tangible goods, time) from the population at large through an Internet platform. In return 
for their contributions, the crowd can receive a number of tangibles or intangibles, which depend on 
the type of crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding involves three participants: the crowd (or contributors); a crowdfunding 
platform; and the crowdfunding campaign creator. This section focuses on the crowdfunding 
platform and the crowdfunding campaign. Section 3 of this report addresses campaign creators. 
Section 4 discusses the benefits and risks of investing in crowdfunding projects. Finally, section 5 
addresses how all three of these participants are regulated and limited with regard to one type of 
crowdfunding. 
 
2.1. Crowdfunding campaigns 
Crowdfunding campaigns can raise funds for not-for-profit and for-profit projects or organisations. 
Campaign creators can organise their campaign in one of four ways: donation-based, reward-based, 
lending-based, and equity-based (34). 
First, contributors to donation-based crowdfunding campaigns do not receive anything for 
their contributions (35). These types of donations can support any projects. The contributors can 
receive tax deductions for their participation depending on the nature of the project (36). For 
instance, the Germany-based website FriendFund is a donation-based platform that was funded in 
2010 and allows campaigners to collect money for anything from their friends or the broader 
crowd (37). 
                                                        
(33) IPTS is also investigating how crowdfunding may offer an alternative means of funding scientific 
research as part of an exploratory study on digital science 2.0 
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/EAP/Science2.0.html. 
(34) An in-depth discussion of reward-based crowdfunding can be found in (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012) and in 
(Hemer, 2011). Others have divided reward-based and pre-sale-based crowdfunding into different 
categories and made the distinction because rewards offer greater profit margins for the fundraisers on 
the goods or services the contributor gets in return as compared to pre-sale of those goods or services. 
See, for example, (De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Marom, 2012, p. 10). However, the distinction is 
marginal and those two categories of crowdfunding are often grouped together. 
(35) Donation-based crowdfunding campaigns are also referred as philanthropic campaigns when they raise 
funds for non-profitmaking campaigns and sponsorship campaigns if contributors receive publicity in 
exchange for their participation. 
(36) For example, Daniel M. Satorius and Stu Polland (2010) discuss some of the pitfalls associated with 
creating a tax deductible crowdfunding campaign in the USA. They highlight the importance of setting up 
the project correctly as well as how the project will be carried out. Setting the organization as non-profit 
has other benefits. For instance, Schwienbacher & Larralde (2010) argue that ‘not-for-organisations tend 
to be more successful in achieving their fundraising targets as compared to for-profit organizations and 
project-based initiatives,’ possibly because not-for-profit put more emphasis on quality and less on profit 
making. 
(37) ‘friendfundFriendfund was founded July 2010 with the aim of building a funding platform which would 
combine the two of Internet’s most progressive aspects: the social web and ecommerce. Our goal is to 
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Second, contributors to a reward-based crowdfunding campaign receive goods or services in 
exchange for their contributions: reward-based crowdfunding is comparable to preselling (38). As 
such, reward-based crowdfunding has not been regulated to the extent that lending- and equity-
based campaigns often have. For instance, the France-based website Ulule is a reward-based 
platform whose participants receive the rewards as described by the project owner (39). 
Third, contributors to a lending-based crowdfunding campaign receive interest payments in 
exchange for financing a project. Lending-based crowdfunding is a form of micro-lending, where 
contributors can select a project with an associated rate of return and maturation date (40). For 
instance, the United Kingdom-based website Funding Circle is a lending-based platform where 
people lend directly to small British businesses: the contributors get higher returns than in 
traditional savings accounts and business owners get funds at lower costs (41). 
Finally, the contributors to equity-based crowdfunding campaigns receive shares in the 
venture in exchange for their contributions. Since equity-based crowdfunding platforms emit shares, 
they fall under the authority of individual state financial authorities. Most of the equity 
crowdfunding currently occurs in Europe, but most platforms choose a business model that avoids 
falling under these financial authorities (this point is discussed in more detail below) (42). For 
instance, the Finland-based website Invesdor is an equity-based platform, which funds companies 
in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Estonia (43). 
 
2.2. Crowdfunding platforms 
Platforms for all four campaign types exist in Europe (44). Donations remain the predominant source 
of fundraising: a survey of platforms showed that 49 % of the $575 million raised globally in 2011 
came from donation campaigns, 11 % of funds came through reward-based campaigns, 22 % of 
funds came through lending-based campaigns, and 18 % came through equity-based 
campaigns (45). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
provide the online community with financial tools which utilize the power of popular social networks like 
Facebook and Twitter in a fun, simple and transparent way.’ http://www.friendfund.com/en/aboutus (last 
visited 28 August 2014). 
(38) Reward-based campaign requires that the campaign creator can offer some product or service for 
rewards. This creator can offer various rewards depending on the contribution level; however, they may 
also offer multiple identical products — possibly combined with a volume discount. 
(39) ‘On Ulule you can discover and make wonderful projects happen. Projects are successfully financed only 
if they reach (or exceed!) their funding goal’ http://www.ulule.com/about/faq/ (last visited 28 August 
2014). 
(40) Some variations in lending models allows the contributors to pick the project (peer-to-peer model, in 
which lenders and debtors can contact each other); in other models (the micro-finance model), lenders 
and debtors can remain completely anonymous (altruistic endeavours in third world countries often use 
this model). See, for example (Hemer, 2011, pp. 15-17); (De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Marom, 2012, 
p. 11).  
(41) ‘Funding Circle was created with a big idea: to revolutionize the outdated banking system and secure a 
better deal for everyone. Thousands of loans later, we’ve helped businesses expand, investors prosper 
and the economy grow.’ https://www.fundingcircle.com/about-us (last visited 28 August 2014). 
(42) (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(43) ‘Invesdor is a pioneering equity-based crowdfunding platform in N Europe. We provide an online 
investment matching service where entrepreneurs looking to raise equity financing can easily connect 
with investors who are seeking to discover and invest in exciting new startups and growth companies 
from Northern Europe.’ https://www.invesdor.com/en/about (last visited Aug., 28, 2014). 
(44) An example of a donation-based platform is Onepercent in the Netherlands. Examples of reward-based 
platforms are Verkami in Spain, Crowdculture in Sweden, Pleasefund.us in the United Kingdom. Examples 
of lending-based platforms are Leihdeinerstadtgeld in Germany or Zopa in the United Kingdom. 
Examples of equity-based platforms are Symbid in the Netherlands and Socioinversores.es in Spain. 
(45) Charman-Anderson (2012) extracted numbers from (Crowdsourcing.org, 2012). The Massolution report 
(Crowdsourcing.org, 2012) estimated the funds raised by crowdfunding platforms in 2011: the survey 
respondents provided the total raised funds ($575 million), the report estimated what large platforms 
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However, the distribution of platforms is changing: in 2011, the number of platforms 
supporting donation campaigns grew by 41 %, while the number of platforms supporting reward-
based campaign grew by 79 %. During the same year, the number of platforms supporting lending-
based campaigns grew by 50 % while that of platforms supporting equity-based campaigns grew 
by 114 % (46). The distribution of platforms according to the type of crowdfunding may further 
change in 2014 because France, Italy, the USA, and the United Kingdom passed new regulations 
that facilitate equity-based crowdfunding and these regulations have already been implemented or 
are to be implemented within the year 2015. 
 Questions have been raised about the usefulness of an intermediary platform because 
about 73 % of contributions actually come from the campaigner’s family and friends (47). However, 
using a platform serves multiple purposes. 
First, crowdfunding platforms facilitate raising funds from friends and family because it 
removes some of the stigma associated with asking these friends and family for money (48). 
Second, platforms keep a public webpage about each project. Of course, this public forum 
gives creators a place to publicise their projects and an opportunity to access the platforms’ broader 
networks. But this public webpage can reassure potential contributors because they can see 
whether a crowd donated to a project. If others believe in a project, contributors may be more 
inclined to donate as well. This has been referred as the wisdom of the crowd, where individuals 
take into account the collective opinion in order to make their own decision (49). The model the 
platform uses plays an important role in this wisdom. Most platforms use the all-or-nothing model 
where they divest the funds collected to the campaign creator only if the target is reached (50). 
Furthermore, thanks to these public webpages, potential contributors can also see who 
donates: if contributors see that individuals who know the campaign creator are contributing as 
well, they may be further encouraged to participate (51). This public forum helps campaign creators 
receive feedback as well. 
Third, the use of a platform has a real cost because platforms collect a fee for their 
services — which the creator must account for in his/her project — and some less tangible costs 
                                                                                                                                                                             
raised according to a model and based on key metrics ($827 million), and the report estimated the 
average amount of funds raised by small platforms ($68 million) for an estimated total of $1 470 
million raised in 2011. The $575 million figure only reports what the survey respondents disclosed. 
(46) (Crowdsourcing.org, 2012). 
(47) In an interview reported in Ridgway (2013), a platform funder confirmed this statistic. One study finds a 
correlation between the extent of the campaign creator’s network and the likelihood of reaching his/her 
target: ‘To take an average project in the Film category, a founder with 10 Facebook friends would have 
a 9 % chance of succeeding, one with 100 friends would have a 20 % chance of success, and one with 
1000 friends would have a 40 % chance of success.’ (Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An 
Exploratory Study., 2014). Interviews conducted on behalf of JRC-IPTS confirm these findings (Green, de 
Hovos, Barnes, Baldauf, & Behle, 2013). Kickstarter published that of its 2.2 million people who backed 
projects in 2012, only 570 672 backed two or more 
(https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2012#repeat_backers). In 2013, Kickstarter published that 3 million 
people pledge to projects in 2013, however, only 807 733 backed more than one project. Therefore, 
about 74 % of backers backed only one project in 2012 and 71 % in 2013.  
(48) One survey respondent explained that she opted for crowdfunding because ‘it might be a nicer way to 
ask friends and family to support you’ (Green, de Hovos, Barnes, Baldauf, & Behle, 2013, p. 43). 
(49) In his book, James Surowiecki illustrates the power and the danger of online crowds, but argues that 
under the right conditions, the crowds can make better decisions than individuals (Surowiecki, 2005). 
(50) Some donation-based crowdfunding platforms also use a keep-it-all model, where the platform divests 
the funds collected regardless of whether the target has been reached. One platform follows the bounty 
model (www.bountysource.com), where this platform divests the funds raised to the individual from the 
crowd who completes the open-source software project posted by the campaign creator; the contributor 
gets a copy of the software as well. 
(51) The ‘investments from friends and family, if not identified as such, could be interpreted by other 
investors as investing primarily based on the perceived financial prospects of the venture. This would 
lead those receiving the signals to have a positive bias on what the crowd perceives these prospects to 
be’ (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 25). 
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such as the time spent running a campaign. These tangible and intangible costs send a signal about 
the campaign creator’s belief in his/her project (52). 
Finally, platforms lend legitimacy to projects because these platforms check the 
campaigner, his/her information, his/her projects, and platforms employ various anti-fraud 
procedures to assure the safety for consumers (53). Platforms have a strong incentive to assure that 
their website does not get a reputation to only attract fraudulent or bad projects because platforms 
are repeat players into the crowdfunding market. To compete, platforms must offer a valuable 
product to their consumers — who are the potential campaign creators as well as potential 
contributors (54). 
Since platforms have incentives to regulate themselves, it may cast some doubt on the 
usefulness of regulation. Yet, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have passed crowdfunding-
specific laws. While Italian regulators focus on equity crowdfunding, French and UK regulators 
tackle both lending and equity crowdfunding. 
Other EU Member States already have regulations in place that regulate lending and share 
emissions undertaken by crowdfunding platforms but without facilitating the process for platforms 
to emit shares. Hence, some platforms have followed these regulations to operate without suffering 
legal consequences (55); some platforms adapt to stay clear of the general banking regulations (56); 
and the rest of the platforms prefer to challenge the unclear financial rules that may apply to 
crowdfunding (57). 
 
                                                        
(52) (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2013) discussing the different costs associated with signals 
such as going through the due diligence process. 
(53) See, for example, (Ramos, Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of 
Crowdfunding Platforms., 2014, pp. 30-31); (De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Marom, 2012, pp. 7, 15). 
(54) See, for example (Ramos, Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of 
Crowdfunding Platforms., 2014, pp. 30-31); (De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Marom, 2012, pp. 14-15). 
(55) For instance, in France, WiSeed, funded in 2008, is an equity crowdfunding platform that allowed 
companies to raise up to €100 000 until 2012 when it associated a financial institution allowing 
WiSEED to raise up to €1 million. ‘WiSEED, supporting projects raising up to €100 000, via investments 
of not less than €100 per investor, and also projects funded by less than 150 non-qualified investors’ 
(Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(56) For instance, the holding model creates a holding company where the contributors buy in, and this 
holding owns the business funded (Hemer, 2011, p. 16). For instance, Symbid 
(http://symbid.com/pages/how_it_works) investment is done through a cooperative that is established in 
the Netherlands. http://symbid.com/pages/model (last visited 29 August 2014). For instance, Seedrs acts 
as a nominee manager and holds the shares for the investor. https://www.seedrs.com/invest (last visited 
29 August 2014). In the club model, the platform recruits ‘qualified’ investors who enjoy less legal 
protection; the platform also acts as an intermediary and avoids handling money. This type of 
crowdfunding parallels angel networks (Hemer, 2011, p. 17). For instance, MyMicroInvest 
(https://www.mymicroinvest.com/en/about) used to operate along this system of only involving 
professional investors (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 16); AngelList allows investors to form ‘syndicates’ of 
investors, which are similar to investment funds in order for potential contributors to invest together in a 
project. https://angel.co/syndicates (last visited 29 August 2014). Some crowdfunding platforms do not 
handle money and only serve as intermediaries to put investors and company owners in contact. 
‘SociosInversores act as an intermediary between entrepreneurs and investors but do not collect or 
distribute any money. For their services, the platform charges five per cent of the total amount invested 
in a project. This model means that the platform is able to avoid legal limitations that other 
crowdfunding platforms can face, particularly if they take up roles that are in some countries exclusive 
to banks’ (Green, de Hovos, Barnes, Baldauf, & Behle, 2013, p. 60). 
(57) ‘In Germany, for instance, the basic assumption until recently was that crowdfunding platforms could 
only raise as much as € 100 000 per project. The founder of equity platform Seedmatch challenged this 
paradigm though, by drawing up arrangements between investors and equity-offering companies based 
on ‘a so called ‘partiarisches Darlehen’ or a profit participating loan’ contract. The German financial 
authority recognized and accepted this bit of innovation, and Seedmatch can now raise equity rounds 
above the €100 000 limit, but it faces an uncertain future with regards to laws governing the screening 
of potential investors and fundraisers’ (Weinstein, 2013, p. 447). 
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3. Crowdfunding strategies for innovations and innovative start-ups 
Crowdfunding (equity and non-equity-based) can help early-stage and innovative ventures 
according to industry experts (58); and many innovators use crowdfunding to finance their 
innovation (59). However, crowdfunding may not be ‘a solution for each and every start-up out 
there.’ (60) Understanding how campaigns are implemented helps identify the challenges that 
entrepreneurs and innovators face; it helps narrow down how these entrepreneurs can appropriately 
use crowdfunding; and finally, it may help implement policies encouraging crowdfunding-financed 
innovation. 
 
3.1. Implementing a crowdfunding campaign 
The IPTS and DG Internal Market and Services have recently completed two reports on crowdfunding 
within the context of crowd-employment, i.e. employment created using online communities. 
The first report looks at five crowdfunding platforms (61). The five crowdfunding platforms 
mirror the five types of crowdfunding discussed above: donation, simple reward, pre-sale, lending, 
and equity. Each platform is the object of a case study in the report (62). Each case study is carried 
out through interviews with platform managers and dives into the functioning of platforms and 
campaigns. These managers also echo some of the concerns discussed below and call for a 
harmonisation of the regulations to allow for cross-border equity crowdfunding and call for a 
lightening of the paperwork. 
The IPTS and DG Internal Market and Services’ second report looks at crowdfunding within 
the broader context of crowd-employment (63). The report looks at two case studies: one reward-
based crowdfunding platform in the United Kingdom and one equity-based crowdfunding platform 
in Spain (64). The case studies are based upon interviews of platform funders, campaign creators, 
and campaign contributors. The campaign creators express their desire to go beyond raising money 
and to market their projects but are often surprised by the skills required, the complexities, and the 
demands of the campaign 
 (65). 
The fund-seeker must define their campaign strategy before they start the campaign. The 
strategy can be divided in two aspects: the static process at the start; and the dynamic process 
during the campaign and after the campaign. 
All the static decisions affect the fund-seeker’s chances of success. At the start of a campaign, 
the campaigner must: 
 decide whether to raise money for a one-shot project that offers a product or service, a 
single product or service offered by a start-up or more established company, or to finance a 
whole company. This decision drives the type of crowdfunding the fund-seekers may use: 
                                                        
(58) One expert (Hans-Christian Heinemeyer, co-founder and managing director, about their crowdinvesting 
round at companisto.de) states that ‘[he] ha[s] experienced myself several times that bank and bankers 
do hardly and seldom understand startups and new business ideas. Crowdinvesting is therefore a 
promising approach for financing risky early stage ventures. Hence, [he is] convinced that crowdinvesting 
will outgrow the financing of startups by traditional banks.’ (Schwering, et al., 2013, p. 18). 
(59) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(60) (Schwering, et al., 2013, p. 18). 
(61) Report entitled: Crowdfunding and the role of managers in ensuring the sustainability of crowdfunding 
platforms (2014) http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/Employability-TheFutureofWork.html. 
(62) This report looks at Symbid, 1 %CLUB, Verkami, Crowdculture, and LeihDeinerStadtGeld. 
(63) Report entitled: CrowdEmploy Part II: CrowdFunding — An empirical investigation into the impact of 
crowdfunding on employability (2013), http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=7243 which is 
part of the broader CrowdEmploy: Crowdsourcing case studies — An empirical investigation into the 
impact of crowdsourcing on employability (2013) project 
http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=6814. 
(64) This report looks at Pleasefund.us and SociosInversores.es.  
(65) For a deeper understanding of platforms and the intricacies of platform-managing, please refer to these 
studies. 
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o donation-based and reward-based campaigns usually support a one-shot project or 
a single project within a start-up or company (66); the fund-seeker may need their 
product or service to have reached the prototype phase in order to properly 
campaign and show the crowd what they may receive in exchange for their 
contribution; 
o lending-based and equity-based campaigns help start-ups and more established 
companies raise funds for a variety of projects — at any level of development (67); 
 select the platform: fund-seekers must consider the type of crowdfunding campaign, the 
quality of the associated signal (e.g. advertising), and the platform’s network (68); 
 select the thresholds: 
o if a campaigner ask for too little funding, s/he will not be able to deliver because of 
insufficient funds to reach economies of scale; 
o if a campaigner ask for too much, s/he may not be able to reach the campaign 
threshold; 
o a campaigner must decide whether the project can be over-funded (69); equity-based 
crowdfunding struggles with over-funding because extra funding affects the 
capitalisation the campaigner holds (70); 
o a campaigner must select the duration of the campaign (71); 
 select the reward scheme for reward-based and share scheme for equity-based (72) projects; 
 design the campaign material and advertise the campaign. 
Some platforms allow dynamic decisions: they allow campaigners to modify or adapt their 
campaign to the crowd’s response. For instance, some platforms allow its campaigners to change 
the capitalisation level and share value within limits (73). 
                                                        
(66) Donation and reward-based crowdfunding usually involve smaller campaigns than lending or equity-
based crowdfunding. In 2011, a sample of 25 crowdfunding platforms showed that 90 % of the 
donation- and reward-based projects raised less than $10 000 whereas a sample of 10 lending- and 
equity-based platforms showed that 94 % raised over $10 000 (Crowdsourcing.org, 2012). 
(67) The company can benefit from investor participation. Some crowdfunding offers opportunities for 
passive and active investments (Green, de Hovos, Barnes, Baldauf, & Behle, 2013). 
(68) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(69) Over-funded projects tend to have more delayed delivery than otherwise (Mollick, The Dynamics of 
Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study., 2014). 
(70) For instance, a campaigner can decide to offer 100 shares at a €1 000 each. This €100 000 represents 
50 % of the business equity and the campaigner keeps the remaining €100 000. If the demand 
outpaces the supply, then instead of prices rising like in a market solution, the price of the shares 
remains unchanged. If the platforms and the campaigner allow for overfunding, then the campaigner’s 
interest decreases: assume that the campaign is overfunded by 50 shares or €50 000, then the 
campaigner is left with 25 % of the business and is no longer the majority owner. The number of total 
shares cannot legally change without reviewing the charter of the business. However, ‘[u]nsophisticated’ 
individuals who are acquiring equity in growing companies are likely unaware of the fact that their 
ownership stake in a successful company can, and probably will, be quickly diluted during successive 
fundraising round’  (Weinstein, 2013, p. 452)..  
(71) Mollick (2014) finds that the length of the fundraising period has a statistically significant negative 
impact upon the likelihood of success of reaching the threshold. A long period may send a negative 
signal with regard to the campaigner’s confidence in reaching the threshold. A short period may not 
allow enough time to reach the threshold. 
(72) This share scheme includes but is not limited to the type of shares (e.g. common or preferred shares), 
the price of the shares, and the level of capitalisation. 
(73) While Seedrs does not allow fund-seekers to alter the price or equity of the campaign, Symbid and 
CrowdCube allow entrepreneurs to increase the level of equity (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 16). 
15 
All these choices can overwhelm entrepreneurs. Standardising these choices (74) or the way 
the platform presents their information to campaigners (75) and to the crowd (76) may benefit 
crowdfunding in the long run. 
 
3.2. The benefits of campaigning 
The majority of fund-seekers use crowdfunding after failing to raise sufficient funds in other 
ways (77): hence fund-seekers may use crowdfunding to close the funding gap. First, fund-seekers 
can access funds with less strings attached than with banks or venture capitalists: fund-seekers 
who use crowdfunding keep control of their projects because they may consider or ignore the 
comments they receive from the crowd, they dictate the repayment period for lending crowdfunding 
and the share scheme for equity crowdfunding (78). 
Second, not only can campaigners fill a financial gap, they can fill it at a lower cost as 
well (79). Crowdfunding also allows its users to decide on the type of crowdfunding and the level of 
financing necessary. In other words, crowdfunding platform users have more leverage in their 
financing because they can tailor the campaign to their needs instead of being restricted to what 
banks and venture capitalist are willing to offer. 
Finally, crowdfunding works as a social insurance for innovation because crowdfunding 
allows investors to make small contributions; it spreads the risk of investing in new ventures over a 
larger population of investors (80); fund-seekers do not carry the whole risk of innovating since they 
do not need to invest all their wealth into their venture. It spreads the financial risk and may close a 
financial gap by attracting investors with potentially different risk preferences. 
Beyond financing, fund-seekers can use crowdfunding to climb up the financial escalator 
and to get access to other resources. First, crowdfunding can help them raise funds indirectly. For 
instance, reward crowdfunding is a form of pre-sale and this pre-sale allows an entrepreneur to test 
his/her product. The fund-seeker can use the reward campaign’s results as a market study when 
attempting to obtain traditional forms of financing (81). The fund-seeker can use the funds raised 
through an equity campaign to obtain the rest of the required funds from banks (82). In other words, 
                                                        
(74) For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission imposes that the platform follows the all-or-
nothing model. 
(75) For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires different disclosure levels depending 
on the amount of funds raised. Campaigners must disclose: their tax returns for offering less than 
$100 000; a financial statement reviewed by an independent public accountant for offering from 
$100 000 to $500 000; an audited financial statement for offering over $500 000. 
(76) For instance, the European Commission has legislation on cookies authorisation and it standardises the 
way the cookies can be authorised (ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 July 2002). 
(77) In When firms are Potemkin villages: Entrepreneurs and formal organisation, Mollick and Kuppuswamy 
(2014) find that 57.6 % of fund-seekers, who used Kickstarter for crowdfunding, sought prior funding 
elsewhere from a sample of 158 projects. They also find that 52.5 % of the projects used crowdfunding 
because they could not get funding. 
(78) For instance, Schwartz (2013) discusses how fundraisers can insulate themselves from corporate 
control, pp. 1 481–86. 
(79) Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2013) argue that if crowdfunding is a substitute for other forms of 
investment the cost of financing innovation will decrease. 
(80) Mark Shuttleworth, founder of Ubuntu, a company that used crowdfunding for the funding needs of his 
new smartphone said that ‘We got excited about the idea that we could engage with a community with 
crowd funding. It’s a really powerful new way to connect innovators to early adopters and to spread the 
risk of innovation across people who are really interested.’ (Shead, 2013). 
(81) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013) describe the experience of Pebble, which started as a reward-based 
crowdfunding campaign ($10 million raised) and the company used this success to obtain traditional 
loans ($15 million raised). 
(82) (Mollick & Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding, 2014) find that over 20 % of 
successful crowdfunding campaigns were followed by fundraising from outside sources — from a 
sample of 223 Kickstarter projects. For instance, Oculus VR raised $250 000 through Kickstarter in 
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crowdfunding can dissipate some of the information asymmetry associated with the entrepreneur 
knowing the market better than financiers. 
Next, crowdfunding helps campaigners gain access to other non-financial resources. 
Campaigners often receive feedback and comments during crowdfunding campaigns about the 
product and they may use this information to ameliorate the product (83). Campaigners may also tap 
into the skillset of contributors. Campaigners may contact some investors who are willing to share 
their experience and expertise in this new project (84) because contrary to a traditional IPO, equity 
campaigners know the identity of their investors or contrary to traditional retail sales, reward 
campaigners know the identity of their customers. 
In many respects, crowdfunding helps complement traditional forms of financing but also 
helps gain access to these traditional forms of financing. 
 
3.3. The drawbacks of crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding comes with drawbacks as well. Crowdfunding may not be a valid complement to 
traditional financing options because crowdfunding suffers from some of the same issues as these 
traditional sources of funds. First, equity campaigners may face the same information-asymmetry 
issues with potential investors that they face with banks because they still understand the value of 
their project better than outsiders. To overcome these issues, they must disclose enough 
information to obtain funds from the crowd, but they may also fear that disclosing too much 
information can detrimentally impact the value of their project. A public forum like a crowdfunding 
website may deter fund-seekers because these forums do not lend themselves to non-disclosure 
agreements (while these agreements may be easier to enforce with banks) (85). 
Next, campaigners may suffer from the crowd mentality because ‘investors use the 
decisions of others as an informative signal of project quality.’ (86) The wisdom of the crowds and 
the all-or-nothing model may thus lead to a few projects herding capital. Consequently, innovative 
entrepreneurs may still suffer if their initial network is not wide or wealthy enough to jumpstart the 
project — leading to some of the same class bias as traditional financing. Some experts suggest 
putting ‘upper limits on’ elements such as the investment per project or investors per project or 
maximum share per investor per project in order to avoid such hoarding issues (87). 
Crowdfunding may not allow fund-seekers to climb the financing escalator because it 
suffers from crowdfunding-specific problems. Crowdfunding may suffer from an adverse selection 
bias since investors may believe that fund-seekers use crowdfunding because they could not obtain 
funding in a different way (88). In other words, campaigners may send a negative signal by using 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2012, than obtained $90 million from venture capitalists by 2014, and is about to be acquired by 
Facebook for $2 billion (Luckerson, 2014). 
(83) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 26). 
(84) (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010) use a case study on Media No Mad/Benoot (however, the site has not 
been updated since 2010). ‘Overall, the aim of this investment was to raise money, obviously. But they 
ended up raising something more valuable and sustainable than money, namely skills. So it looks like 
angel or venture capital funding, with the difference that this time 81 people put their skills and abilities 
together in order to provide optimal thinking and services’, p. 17. Helping to find skills has also been 
attributed to traditional financing methods like venture capitalism (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, p. 5). 
(85) Intellectually property (IP) disclosures as well as non-IP protected idea disclosures projects may also 
suffer from these early disclosures (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(86) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(87) ‘The experts interviewed suggested to create exceptions from the Prospectus directive for start-up 
crowdfunding projects. The exceptions could be applied to all crowdfunding platforms certified by a 
central agency or a similar mechanism, with upper limits on one or all of the following criteria: a) Total 
volume of the investment per platform b) Total volume of the investment per project c) Total number of 
investors per platform d) Total numbers of investors per project e) Maximum share per investor per 
project f) Total numbers of projects on a platform’ (Röthler & Wenzlaff, 2011, p. 47). 
(88) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013, p. 21). Any investment involves an asymmetric information problem 
(Hall, 2010). 
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crowdfunding and (some) investors may believe that crowdfunding mostly offers bad investment 
opportunities (89). 
Next, campaigners often struggle to set the appropriated price for shares of their new 
venture (90). In traditional IPOs, intermediary investment banks and the market eventually set the 
price because they can better estimate future earnings of established products (91). Similarly, novel 
(innovative) products and services may not be appropriately priced because markets do not exist 
and have not worked to set their value yet. 
Finally, campaigners may lack competence to organise a successful campaign. They must 
master the crowdfunding platform functioning (92), they must answer questions from the crowds, 
and generally, they must take advantage of social media. The campaign can be so consuming that 
it takes campaigners away from the creative and innovative process (93). 
 
4. Risks associated with crowdfunding for investors 
Investors usually want to participate in crowdfunding ventures because they gain access to new 
products before they are widely commercialised; because they gain access to new investment 
opportunities; because they participate and feel part of a bigger community; or because they build a 
network with other co-investors (94). 
These investors, however, do not participate without being exposed to risks. This section 
investigates five types of risks or complications associated with crowdfunding in the following 
order: first, projects may be schemes to take advantage of investors; second, projects might be led 
by incompetent entrepreneurs; third, crowd investors might not be able to resell the shares they 
purchased; and fourth, unclear regulations and tax laws may apply to crowdfunding. 
 
4.1. Fraud 
Fraud constitutes the biggest threat to crowdfunding campaigns (95). Traditional reputational and 
legal enforcement methods may not work with such campaigns. First, sellers traditionally want to 
protect their reputation and goodwill because they often want repeat customers; however, the 
incentives to not receive a bad review or a bad reputation may not work within the context of 
crowdfunding because of the anonymity of the Internet and because they do not repeatedly 
fundraise (96). 
While fund-seekers may not be repeat players, platforms are. To succeed, these platforms 
have incentives to avoid a reputation as a bad marketplace, to avoid attracting fraudulent schemes 
and to perform due diligence for each project and throughout the campaign (97): platforms may 
associate with banks that have experience evaluating fraudulent projects (98); platforms can stagger 
                                                        
(89) This markets are referred to as ‘market for lemons’ because participating in the market signals that the 
product is not what it seems. See (Akerlof, 1970). Tomboc (2013) discusses in more detail the potential 
information assymetry issues in crowdfunding. 
(90) (Davis & Webb, 2012). 
(91) Innovestment (http://www.innovestment.de/ (last visited.on 2 September 2014) uses an auction to 
decide on valuation (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012, p. 16). 
(92) Mollick (2014) finds that having a video has a statistically significant positive impact upon the likelihood 
of success of reaching the threshold. 
(93) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(94) See, for example (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013); (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010). 
(95) See, for example (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012) (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013) (Ramos, 
Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms., 
2014). 
(96) (Weinstein, 2013, p. 437). 
(97) For instance, Kickstarter cancelled a crowdfunding campaign that showed potential signs of fraud during 
the campaign, after 80 % of the threshold was already reached (Crowdsourcing.org, 2013). 
(98) In the Netherlands, ‘Symbid has an EU banking licence, through its finance partner Intersoft. This allows 
EU investors to invest in Dutch companies. Foreign entrepreneurs must set-up a legal entity in the 
Netherlands’ (Ramos, Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of 
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the fund release to limit the size of the funds affected (99); etc. The IPTS has investigated in more 
detail the role of platform managers in helping prevent fraud. (100) Markets, accordingly, have a 
place to play to prevent fraud. 
Second, legal enforcement may also fail because each individual investor does not have 
enough incentive to sue for fraud or breach of contract, because crowdfunding relies on small 
investments from many investors instead of large investments from a few investors; hence, these 
small amounts do not provide each individual investor with enough incentive to investigate and 
report fraud. Consequently, crowdfunding investors can become targets for fraudulent activities 
including fraudulent and pyramid schemes (101). 
Overall, fraud seems, however, to remain rare (102) and investors may be willing to invest 
despite these fraud risks because of limited exposure and risk diversification (103). Investors can 
invest small amounts in crowdfunding projects to diminish their risk exposure. Investors can also 
invest in multiple projects and diversify their risks. Beyond the wisdom of the crowds and all-or-
nothing model anti-fraud features, the crowd plays a role as well in fraud prevention. Individual 
investors also send signals about projects because the broader crowd can generally see who invest 
and whether people with personal knowledge of the campaigner (such as friends and family) 
participate and donate to the project. 
Fraud is a real risk but platforms and the crowd have their place to play in preventing fraud. 
 
4.2. Incompetence 
Apart from intentional fraud, projects may unintentionally fail because entrepreneurs are 
incompetent or have miss-calibrated their projects. The wisdom of the crowds and the all-or-
nothing model temper issues of incompetence because the crowd gravitates towards projects that 
send the correct signals and enough investors must perceive the same signals for the project to 
become viable (104). Much like with fraud, the level of investment from friends and family sends 
signals about the quality of the entrepreneur. 
 
4.3. Lack of efficient secondary market for equity-based crowdfunding 
Investors, much like campaign creators before them, may struggle to price their investment when 
they exit if they cannot use market mechanisms. For equity-based crowdfunding, the slow 
development of a secondary market (105) also slows the development of the primary market (106). 
While investors join a project for different reasons, the majority participates with the expectation to 
break even (107). In order to recoup their investments, they must sell their shares back to the 
entrepreneur or to other investors (108). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Crowdfunding Platforms., 2014, p. 30). 
(99) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012) When asked, some experts recommend certain minimum requirements to 
avoid fraud including escrow account and other disclosure requirements involving disclosing a detailed 
business plan and ownership (Röthler & Wenzlaff, 2011). 
(100) On top of discussing the role of platform managers in helping prevent fraud, this IPTS report also 
addresses how platform managers guide campaign creators along the way (Ramos, Crowdfunding and 
the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms., 2014), 
http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=7243. 
(101) Another potential issue with crowdfunding is that it might also be used to launder money. While money 
laundering is distinguishable from pyramid schemes, platforms as well as investors may need to be 
aware of this issue. 
(102) In a sample of 381 Kickstarter products, 3 issued refunds and 11 stopped responding to backers: 3.65 % 
of the projects were incomplete (Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study., 2014). 
(103) Rational economic theory should dictate that investors implicitly add these risks to their valuation of any 
project. 
(104) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(105) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2013). 
(106) (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012); (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(107) (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2010) ‘For most of [investors in Media No Mad], the concept of investing in 
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If an entrepreneur offers to purchase the shares back, investors cannot know whether the 
offer is appropriate (109). If investors sell the shares to subsequent investors, the original investors 
may struggle to set the price. Individuals with experience in assessing companies (like venture 
capitalists and business angels) (110) may not want to participate in crowdfunding because they may 
prefer to be active in the process or worry also about the exit issues (111). 
 
4.4. Taxation 
Platforms and campaigners face numerous issues related to tax and donations. First, many 
countries provide tax credits for donations to non-profitmaking ventures. Campaigners argue that 
contributors should receive the same tax deductions for the funds they donated through 
crowdfunding platforms (112). However, they may not be able to do so because crowdfunding 
platforms are often profitmaking organisations and take fees (113). These tax deductions impact 
which projects and innovations get funded. 
Second, in many countries, tax relief currently varies depending on whether companies 
finance their research and development through earnings, equity or debt (114). These diverging tax 
treatments may influence the demand for funds, how crowdfunding evolves, and how investors as 
well as fund-seekers frame their campaigns (115). 
 
4.5. Regulations 
On the one hand, reward-based crowdfunding receives little attention from regulators because it is 
a form of pre-sale and enjoys traditional consumer protection (e.g. breach of contract if a product is 
not delivered). Consumer groups, however, have expressed concerns about certain projects and 
product safety ( 116 ): these groups argue that, without proper supervision, reward-based 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a company in order to make a later profit by reselling the shares was not the most important reason for 
investing. Indeed, when asked if they were expecting to make high profits from the deal, 78 % answer 
that they are not planning to earn from it neither do they want to make a loss.’ 
(108) (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2013) study 104 equity crowdfunding projects in Australia and 
find ‘that start-ups that signal their intention to seek an exit by either IPO or a trade sale are more likely 
to attract investors than those planning to use other forms of exit.’ 
(109) (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(110) A wide range of literature discusses how venture capitalists evaluate start-ups. See, for example (Miloud, 
Aspelund, & Cabrol, 2012); (Block, De Vries, Schumann, & Sandner, 2014). 
(111) Cumming finds that ‘the probability of acquisition is … more likely when the [venture capitalists] have 
effective contractual control rights.’ Thus, revealed preferences suggest that venture capitalists prefer 
acquisitions to public offerings as a means of exiting when given the opportunity to force an acquisition 
instead of a public offering (Cumming D. , 2008). ‘The [venture capitalist] will typically retain its shares 
at the date of the public offering, selling shares into the market in the months or years following the 
[initial public offering]’ (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003, p. 513). Therefore, venture capitalists may not 
want to participate in equity-based crowdfunding. 
(112) (Ramos, Crowdfunding and the Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding 
Platforms., 2014). 
(113) (Wheat, Wang, Byrnes, & Ranganathan, 2013). 
(114) (Hall, 2010). 
(115) (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economica 
nd Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2014); (European Commission; Directorate 
General Internal Market and Services, 2014). 
(116) One project, the Polar Pen + Stylus, involving magnets has raised concerns about product safety. The 
project was successfully financed in October 2013 
(https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1171695627/polar-pen-both-tool-and-toy-pen-stylus-made-from-
m). However, one consumer group (Consumers Union Policy & Action from Consumer Reports) has raised 
these concerns with the US Consumer Product Safety Commission (Consumers Union, 2013). Health 
Canada, the Canadian Consumer Protection Agency, quashed the product for safety reasons (Mertl, 
2013). Another project, Sprayable Energy (http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/sprayable-energy), that was 
successfully funded, has raised concerns that the product could have dangerous side effects. See, for 
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crowdfunding may put dangerous products in the stream of commerce and that a larger section of 
the population may be put at risk because of the wider (Internet) reach of crowdfunding. 
On the other hand, lending- and equity-based crowdfunding have received more attention 
from regulators. Lending crowdfunding competes with banks, which are often heavily regulated. 
Equity-based crowdfunding relies on share emission, which often falls under the local national 
financial authorities. Regulations of lending and equity-based crowdfunding can be convoluted. 
Therefore, some platforms are organised in ways to stand clear of these regulations (117) while other 
platforms prefer to challenge the unclear financial rules that may apply to crowdfunding (118). 
 
5. Current regulations control all three actors 
This section focuses on equity-based crowdfunding because it can be used to finance start-ups (119), 
and it has spawned the current crop of crowdfunding-specific regulations. Equity-based 
crowdfunding also presents the biggest risks for fraud and failure (120). The three crowdfunding 
actors (the crowd, the crowdfunding platform, and the campaigner) have been regulated: this 
section analyses how regulations in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have addressed each 
actor, and compares regulations in these EU Member States to the US regulations. 
At the European Union level, the European Commission has already in place a number of 
directives that can apply to equity crowdfunding (121). Some EU Member States such as France, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom are passing equity- (and sometimes lending-) based crowdfunding 
regulations (122). Other Member States such as Germany are currently considering their own 
                                                                                                                                                                             
example (Hamblin, 2013) (Zimmerman, 2013). 
(117) See, for example SociosInversores discussed in footnote 56. 
(118) ‘In Germany, for instance, the basic assumption until recently was that crowdfunding platforms could 
only raise as much as €100000 per project. The founder of equity platform Seedmatch challenged this 
paradigm though, by drawing up arrangements between investors and equity-offering companies based 
on ‘a so called ‘partiarisches Darlehen’ or a profit participating loan’ contract. The German financial 
authority recognized and accepted this bit of innovation, and Seedmatch can now raise equity rounds 
above the €100 000 limit, but it faces an uncertain future with regards to laws governing the screening 
of potential investors and fundraisers’ (Weinstein, 2013, p. 447). 
(119) Specifically, donation/reward campaigns involve small amounts: Kickstarter, the leading platform for 
donations/rewards, has reported that the average raised is $18 800. Lending campaigns are larger but 
remain similar. Companisto, a German-based lending crowdfunding platform, limits loans to €25 000 
and loans average about €5 000 (https://www.auxmoney.com/infos/statistiken) and Funding Circle, a UK-
based lending crowdfunding platform, does not limit the amount but had loans averaging about 
£60 000 in 2013 (https://www.fundingcircle.com/blog/2013/12/2013-a-year-in-numbers/). In 
comparison, Wiseed, a French-based equity crowdfunding platform, helped fund 11 projects in 2013, 
raising, on average, €327 000 (http://www.journaldunet.com/ebusiness/le-net/2013-crowdfunding-
bilan/wiseed.shtml) and CrowdCube, the UK leader in equity crowdfunding, helped fund 54 projects in 
2013, raising, on average, £226 000 (http://www.crowdcube.com/2013/) (last visited 8 October 2014). 
(120) Equity crowdfunding also usually involves higher risks: donation/reward campaigns have traditional 
consumer law remedies at their disposal; lending campaigns involve individuals with a track-record — 
much like bank loans; and equity campaigns involve start-ups, which fail frequently (according to a 
Eurostat Business Statistic, one out of two new companies fail within three years of its creation and two 
out of three fail within five years of its creation). 
(121) Directive 2003/71/EC as amended by Directive 2010/73/EC (Prospectus Directive) impacts how 
companies raise funds. Directive 2009/65/EC (Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities Directive) impacts how investment companies can raise funds. Directive 2006/48/EC (Capital 
Requirements Directive) and Directive 2009/110/EC (E-Money Directive) impacts how crowdfunding 
platforms can hold funds. Directive 2011/61/EC (Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive) can 
impact how crowdfunding platform function if they deal with investment companies. Directive 
2004/39/EC (Market in Financial Instrument Directive) can impact how crowdfunding platform are 
regulated. 
(122) In France, Le ministre des finances et des comptes publics et le ministre de l’économie, du redressement 
productif et du numérique (finance minister) presented the Ordonnance No 2014-559 of 30 May 2014, 
which tackles lending and equity crowdfunding. The ordonnance was completed with Décret n° 2014-
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position ( 123 ). These individual regulations regulate equity crowdfunding differently and 
crowdfunding in the EU may benefit from a harmonisation effort to avoid inconsistencies between 
Member States. 
 
5.1. Crowdfunding platforms 
Currently, crowdfunding platforms are regulated in a number of ways: 
 regulatory registration with the national licensing authority; 
 institutional requirements — including capital requirement for platforms; 
 limiting the models of crowdfunding. 
 
The new equity-crowdfunding-specific regulations in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States require that funds are raised from the crowd through a crowdfunding platform 
and that this platform is registered as broker. The respective regulations have recently come into 
play in France (1 October 2014) (124) and the United Kingdom (transition period ended 1 October 
2014) (125) but in the United States (expected in 2015) the regulations have yet to come into play. 
In the United Kingdom, the platforms must be registered (126) whereas the US regulator 
requires equity crowdfunding platforms to hold a broker licence and comply with these broker-
dealer regulations (127). In France, the platform managers must obtain a newly created licence as an 
investment-crowdfunding adviser after successfully passing tests and evaluations (128). In Italy, the 
law was passed in December 2012, and eight platforms have registered in Italy as of September 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1053 du 16 septembre 2014 relatif au financement participatif, JORF n°0215 du 17 septembre 2014 
page 15228 texte n° 11, Art. 2, 2°, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJO.do (last visited Septembre 17, 
2014). In Italy, lending crowdfunding is not regulated by specific laws whereas equity crowdfunding is 
regulated by Law No 221 of 17 December 2012 (Law 221/2012) and by Commissione Nationale per le 
Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) Regulation of 26 June 2013 No 18592 (CONSOB regulation). In July 2013, 
the British government passed the Amendment to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to 
address the exemptions that lending and equity-based crowdfunding have exploited (Tax & Legal Work 
Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(123) Since early 2014, Germany has been looking into equity crowdfunding regulations that would potentially 
tighten the current set of regulations. See, for example (AltFi News, 2014); (Hobey, 2014); (Aschenbeck-
Florange, 2014). Current regulations in Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands allow for equity 
crowdfunding under these current non-crowdfunding-specific regulations but these general fundraising 
regulations limit the amount which may be raised (€100 ,000 — in compliance with Directive 
2003/71/EC as amended by Directive 2010/73/EU (Prospectus Directive)). Under Dutch financial 
regulations, crowdfunding campaigns may be able to raise up to €2.5 million. Switzerland and Australia 
are the other OECD countries which allow crowdfunding. 
(124) 1 October 2014, Ordonnance No 2014-559, Art. 37. 
(125) (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014). For an example of a UK platform that has received such 
certification, such as CrowdCube please visit the Financial Services Register at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/register/firmBasicDetails.do?sid=290368 (last visited July 24, 2014). The 
crowdfunding platform Crowdcube also specifies on its website that it received the appropriate status to 
emit shares (http://www.crowdcube.com/pg/accreditations-and-associations-80) (last visited 24 July 
2014). 
(126) The lending platforms in the UK are also required to abide by a ‘conduct of business rules…, minimum 
capital requirements, client money protection rules, dispute resolution rules and a requirement for firms 
to take reasonable steps to ensure existing loans continue to be administered if the firm goes out of 
business’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013, p. 7) (emphasis added). 
(127) Section II.C.1 (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). In the past, the United States has sanctioned 
individuals who were attempting to perform a crowdfunding campaign without the proper registration. 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-122.htm (last visited 24 July 2014). 
(128) Conseillers en investissements participatifs. Titre I, Chap. VII, Section 1, Art. L. 547-1. Note that 
traditional advisers (prestataire de services d’investissement) may also serve as intermediaries for these 
crowdfunding efforts. 
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2014 (129) and platforms like Stars Up (130) and Assiteca Crowd (131) have already successfully funded 
projects. 
Such licensing and registration requirements impose costs on platforms. These licensing 
requirements create barriers to entry. These barriers impact the number of platforms, the cost of 
crowdfunding, and grant platforms some oligopoly power. Therefore, licensing requirements involve 
a delicate balancing act (132). 
Alternatively, regulators in Italy require the platform to be attached to a financial 
institution (133). Attaching platforms to banks limits companies that can enter the platform market 
and hence raises costs; however, it may decrease the chances of fraud as discussed above.  (134) In 
the United Kingdom, platforms that perform lending crowdfunding are subject to minimum capital 
requirements (135). These requirements impose higher barriers to entry because they require further 
capital before the platform creation. 
Platforms may have to perform their due diligence on the fund-seekers or may have to 
access the investor’s understanding of the risks involved. For instance, in the USA, the platforms 
have the onus of performing a minimum (undefined) due diligence about the fund-seeker to assure 
that the project is not a fraudulent scheme (136). In the United Kingdom (and in France as well), 
platforms must ask the investing crowd to pass an ‘appropriateness test,’ where the investors must 
certify that he or she understands the risks involved with investing (137). 
Platform business models have also been regulated. For instance, US regulators have 
imposed that platforms must employ the all-or-nothing model because it has considerable upsides 
and has proven to help limit the number of fraudulent projects (138). Standardising or limiting the 
model employed by crowdfunding platforms may also benefit contributors because it saves these 
contributors from having to learn the specifics of each platform. 
An additional issue addressed by regulators is overfunding of projects. 
Over-funding presents an issue for crowdfunding (139) and how innovations are going to be 
financed. Crowds often herd around projects and hence the investment tends to concentrate around 
a few projects instead of maximising the number of projects funded. Limiting overfunding may 
                                                        
(129) The law was passed in December 2012, rules implemented in June 2013, the first platform was 
registered in October 2013 and the fifth was registered on 16 July 2014. One platform was 
automatically registered under the special section of CONSOB regulations 
(http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/intermediari/portali/gestori_portali.xml?xsl=gest_ord_en.xsl&sym
blink=/mainen/intermediares/portali/os.html) (last visited 22 July 2014).  
(130) http://www.starsup.it/ 
(131) http://www.assitecacrowd.com/ 
(132) For instance, these requirements need to be easy enough to obtain to avoid creating a monopoly; they 
need to be hard enough to obtain for platforms to gain enough market shares to survive; they need to 
be easy enough to lose to make incentive platforms perform their due diligence; they need to be hard 
enough to lose to avoid filtering welfare-improving projects. 
(133) One platform was automatically registered under the special section of CONSOB regulations 
(http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/intermediari/portali/banche_iv.xml?xsl=gest_spec_en.xsl&symbli
nk=/mainen/intermediares/portali/ss.html) (last visited 22 July 2014). 
(134) (Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(135) (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014). 
(136) (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013, p. 143). 
(137) (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013, p. 64). 
(138) The proposed rules require that the offering specifies a minimum amount — the threshold — as well as 
a maximum offering (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013, pp. 183-84). 
(139) As explained by UK-based Seedrs, projects may become overfunded; but the project can only be 
overfunded if the entrepreneurs can offer the additional equity; the equity offered cannot in any case be 
diluted during a specific round of crowdfunding 
(http://www.seedrs.com/faq/items/89_what_is_overfunding_of_campaigns). One success story involves 
AoTerra (https://www.seedmatch.de/startups/aoterra (last visited 24 July 2014)), which involved a 
crowdfunding campaign that originally intended to raise €100 000 but raised €1 000 000 — a 1 000 % 
of its goal. The company was able to set these different goals because it had the adequate capital to 
adjust.  
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assure that fewer projects herd capital. This limit can be expressed as a percentage of the threshold 
at which point a project must stop raising funds. 
Without regulation, a dominant platform may emerge, much like eBay and Amazon 
emerged in their respective sectors, through the competitive process and may set industry 
standards (140). Some industry observers believe that some form of regulations may be required to 
enforce certain aspects of equity crowdfunding "such as a centralized database containing 
information relating to whether particular investors were in compliance with the investment 
limits" (141) until markets can regulate themselves. 
 
5.2. The investing crowd 
As defined earlier, crowdfunding aims at collecting resources from the population at large through 
an Internet platform; it usually aims at raising small sums from a large crowd. Regulations can limit 
who can invest and how much they can invest and this decision impacts the quantity of available 
funds to finance innovation; this decision may also impact the direction of investment and 
innovation. 
Current regulations have limited the investing crowd through addressing the following 
questions. 
 Who can invest? 
 How much can one party invest overall? 
 How much can one party invest on each project? 
 How frequently can one party invest? 
Current national regulations have different approaches on these questions. 
 France does not currently have limits on who can invest and how much they can invest. 
Italian regulation requires that ‘at least 5 % subscription of the share capital is made by a 
professional investor’ before an offer can be executed and processed (142). Italian regulation relies 
on the wisdom of the professional investors to protect the non-professional investing crowd from 
filter fraudulent or doomed projects. Since professional investors are likely better equipped to filter 
bad projects, Italian regulations rely on platforms and professional investors to perform two levels 
of due diligence. This requirement also means that the investments from the crowd compete with 
the professional investor funds because these two types of investors have to gravitate toward the 
same projects (143). 
Instead of complementing traditional financing, this requirement in Italy means that 
crowdfunding in Italy most likely acts as a substitute for early seed venture capitalists. This may 
not, however, prevent crowdfunding to be used as an escalator to financing. This requirement also 
means that projects that struggle to get traditional funding will also struggle to get crowdfunding, 
and that crowdfunding may end up financing essentially the same type of projects that would have 
been financed by professional investors (144). 
UK regulators have limited who can invest and the amount they can invest. Platforms can 
only accept contributions from retail clients that are certified (145) or self-certified (146) as 
                                                        
(140) ‘The expectation of a high reward motivates firms to compete aggressively to become dominant. While 
consumers may pay a price for market dominance, they also benefit from the intense competition that 
occurs in the battle for dominance’ (Gilbert, 2012). 
(141) Nicholas Tommarello, CEO Wefunder, Improving regulation crowdfunding to attract high‐quality start-
ups, comment to the Securities and Exchange Commission (https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-
13/s70913-179.pdf) (last visited 29 July 2014). 
(142) (Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(143) If 5 % is reached, it sends a signal that the project is safe to invest in to other professional investors as 
well as non-professional investors. This may intensify herding. 
(144) For instance, Cantiere Savona, a solar yacht project registered on the platform StarsUp, had reached 
100 % of its threshold target but had to wait 10 more days before the 5 % professional investor 
threshold was reached (http://www.starsup.it/project/cantiere-savona-srl/?lang=eng) (last visited 10 
August 2014). 
(145) A certified sophisticated investor must: (1) have an independent certificate — at most 36 months old — 
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sophisticated investors; retail clients who are certified as high net worth investors;  (147) retail clients 
who confirm they receive investment advice; and restricted investors who will not invest more than 
10 % of their net investible portfolio within a 12-month period (148). In other words, anyone can 
invest 10 % of their net worth as long as they sign the requested statement but professional 
investors can invest without limits. 
US regulators elected instead to limit how much and how frequently people can invest (149). 
All individuals can annually invest up to a threshold: if the investor’s net worth plus income is less 
than $40 000 (about €29 000), then he/she can only invest up to $2 000 (about €1 450); if his/her 
net worth and income combined are less than $100 000 (about €72 500), then he/she can invest 
5 % of his/her income; if his/her income or net worth is greater than $100 000, then the limit is 
10 % of his/her income (150). 
Professional investors already invest by definition. Limiting crowdfunding to these 
traditional investors may allow these investors to invest more cheaply. It, however, does not 
necessarily increase the amount of funds available and consequently the number of funded 
innovative projects. Opening crowdfunding to a wider crowd likely increases the available funds to 
finance-innovative companies; but this approach increases the risk exposure of non-professional 
investors. 
 
Additional issues that are currently not regulated include: 
 maximum investable capital; 
 investment per project — in monetary or proportion of acquisition. 
 
Some regulations have considered some form of cap on investment. The United Kingdom 
caps at 10 % of an investor’s portfolio how much an investor can invest in crowdfunding. The USA 
has a similar limit as well. These limits force investors to diversify their investment and hence 
lessen the impact failed or fraudulent (151) projects can have on a single investor. 
Except for the previously discussed limits, current regulations in France, the United Kingdom, 
Italy and the USA, do not explicitly limit how much an investor can invest in a single project. Limiting 
how much can be invested in a single project would limit how deeply an investor can be impacted 
as well because it also forces diversification. 
 
5.3. Entrepreneurs’ fundraising 
All four current national regulations also tackle the following questions related to fundraisers 
differently. 
 Who can crowds fundraise? 
                                                                                                                                                                             
proving they understand the risks associated with investing; and (2) have signed within 12 months a 
statement that specifies that investing involves risks and they are willing to take these risks (COBS 
4.7.9R; COBS 4.12.7). 
(146) A self-certified sophisticated investor is an individual who has signed, within the period of 12 months 
ending with the day on which the communication is made, a statement that acknowledges the risks 
involved with investing, and have worked in the financial sector with a company with at least a £1 
million turnover (COBS 4.7.9R; COBS 4.12.8). 
(147) The investor ‘had, throughout the financial year … an annual income … of £100 000 or more;’ (about 
€120 000) or ‘held, throughout the financial year … net assets to the value of £250 000 or more’ 
(about €300 000) (COBS 4.7.9R; COBS 4.12.6). Converting values into US dollars, British pound sterling, 
and euros using the Federal Reserve Board exchange rate data on 31 December 2013 ($1.6574 to £1 
and $1.3799 to €1) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_uk.htm) (last visited 14 
August 2014). 
(148) COBS 4.7.10. (Financial Conduct Authority, 2013, p. 38).  
(149) See the United States Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) H.R. 3606 (2012).  
(150) The Securities and Exchange Commission is still in consultation on the interpretation of these thresholds. 
(151) Fraud is likely inevitable regardless of who can invest since fraud like pyramid schemes existed before 
crowdfunding and will continue to exist. 
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 How much can they raise? 
 How often? 
 
The Italian regulations restrict who can fundraise. In Italy, regulations allow equity 
crowdfunding only for innovative start-ups. To qualify as innovative, the start-up may not be older 
than 48 months, with a yearly turnover value not exceeding €5 million; it must aim to develop, 
produce, and market innovative products and services of high technological value, and invest a 
minimum level in research and development. The Italian regulations limit also the amount raised to 
€5 million in a 12-month period (152). 
France limits fund-seekers to raising €1 million every 12 months (153). The UK regulation 
also limits the amount raised to €5 million in a 12-month period to avoid having to abide by the 
prospectus requirement (154). The US legislation allows fund-seekers to raise up to $1 000 000 
(about €725 000) in a 12-month period (155). In the USA, depending on the amount raised, the 
fundraiser has different filing requirements (with an initial cost (156) as well as yearly compliance 
cost) (157). 
All these regulations allow multiple crowdfunding efforts and the maximum limits are 
cumulative over all the different crowdfunding. These regulations have also all elected a 12-month 
period before fund-seekers can organise new rounds of fundraising. Beside these two common 
points, the other limits vary greatly. 
 
5.4. Other regulations 
French, Italian, UK and US legislators have also regulated other aspects of equity crowdfunding and 
its instruments. Italian regulations further prohibit the emission of ‘debt, subordinated securities 
and hybrid instruments not representing the share capital.’ (158) The US regulations allow the 
emission of debt, but the USA has prohibited the shares from becoming tradable for a 12-month 
period. Further regulations with regard to the types of shares and their tradability offer 
opportunities to alleviate some of the risks associated with crowdfunding. 
To protect the investors who are the most susceptible to fraud, both US and UK legislators 
have also limited advertisement and promotion campaigns creators can disseminate about their 
public offering in the hope of limiting their undue influence. This includes the prohibition of social 
media use to promote offerings (159) whereas social media is a cornerstone to other forms of 
crowdfunding. This regulation of promotion follows other regulation on traditional stock 
offerings (160). 
 
                                                        
(152) (Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(153) Ordonnance No 2014-559 of 30 May 2014. Titre I and Titre I, Chap. II, Art. 11, L. 411-2; Décret 
No  2014-1053 du 16 septembre 2014 relatif au financement participatif, JORF No 0215 du 17 
septembre 2014 page 15228 texte No  11, Art. 2, 2° (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJO.do) (last 
visited 17 September 2014).  
(154) (Tax & Legal Work Group of the European Crowdfunding Network, 2013). 
(155) This can be spread over smaller fundraising campaigns and is distinguished from funds raised in other 
ways such as loans, equity, etc. (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(156) For instance, the US disclosure requirements have an estimated initial cost of between $18 560 and 
$152 260 — depending on the size of funds raised — as compared to an estimated $1.5 million for 
IPOs (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(157) For instance, the US disclosing requirements have an estimated annual cost between $600 and 
$33 600 — depending on the size of funds raised — as compared to an estimated $2.5 million for IPOs 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013). 
(158) (Verna, 2013). 
(159) (Hurley, 2014). 
(160) See, for example, 15 US Code § 77d–1 (2012). 
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5.5. The different goals of the new crowdfunding regulations 
Crowdfunding can exist without a new crowdfunding exemption or regulation. For instance, 
WiSeed (161) in France is an equity crowdfunding platform that allowed companies to raise up to 
€100 000 from its creation in 2008 to 2012 taking advantage of an exemption to the prospectus 
requirement (162). German crowdfunding still uses this exemption to help start-ups raise seed funds. 
Alternatively, crowdfunding methods have been used to raise funds through more traditional 
business angel networks (163). Figure 1 represents the current state of crowdfunding without 
exemptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Funding void under the current EU regulatory framework 
As Figure 1 shows, without new exemptions, crowdfunding methods may facilitate raising small 
funds from the general crowd or may decrease the cost of raising large funds from traditional 
venture capitalists or business angels. While this version of crowdfunding may be used to bridge the 
funding void, some legislators, like the US Congress (164), believe that there is a void that needs 
filling between the finances provided by banks and the ones provided by venture capitalists (165) and 
the current system does not allow for this void to be addressed.  (166) 
                                                        
(161) https://www.wiseed.com/ (last visited 13 August 2014). 
(162) France adopted Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 
2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading 
and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 31.12.2003, L 345/64). Directive 2010/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities 
are admitted to trading on a regulated market (OJ L 327/1, 11.12.2010). This directive has exemptions, 
one of which is the exemption directive (2003/71/EC). Article 3.2(e) allows companies to raise up to 
€100 000 without having to comply with the prospectus requirement, which requires expensive audited 
documents. 
(163) For instance, in the exemption directive (2003/71/EC), Articles 3.2(c) & (d) of the prospectus requirement 
allows companies to raise up to €5 million without a prospectus if each of the funds come from 
qualified investors and each investment is at least €100 000. Another exception allows companies to 
raise up to €5 million without a prospectus if each of the funds come from qualified investors and at 
most 150 non-qualified investors. 
(164) In France, the Finance Ministry also hope that crowdfunding will help start-ups. ‘Ce nouveau mode de 
financement est ouvert aux sociétés par actions simplifiées, ce qui va permettre aux jeunes sociétés d’en 
bénéficier.’ Press release (http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/financement-participatif) (last 
visited 3 September 2014). 
(165) The JOBS act intends to ‘increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access to 
the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.’ Jumpstart our business start-ups act, H. R. 
3606. The SEC ‘understand[s] that Title III was designed to help alleviate the funding gap and 
accompanying regulatory concerns faced by start-ups and small businesses in connection with raising 
capital in relatively low dollar amounts.’ (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013, p. 11) (quoting the 
Congressional debate). 
(166) For instance, companies on WiSeed have raised €220 000 per campaign: 46 companies raised €10.1 
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Therefore, these legislators use these new equity crowdfunding exemptions to fill the gap 
between these two types of investors also known as the funding void or valley of death.  
 
Figure 2 attempts to represent what legislators have been trying to accomplish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Addressing the funding void 
To address the funding void, regulators may focus on certain aspects of or individual participants in 
crowdfunding: 
 the duty placed on the platforms; 
 the limits imposed on the crowd; and 
 the limits imposed on the crowdfund-seeker. 
Limits on one actor may allow relaxing some limits on another actor so that legislators and 
regulators may compensate one aspect or participant limits with regard to the other. 
 
These regulations aim at decreasing the costs of investment for innovators seeking seed 
funds and who likely struggle to get funds otherwise by either expanding the pool of qualified 
investors (United Kingdom/USA) or by creating a new prospectus exemption (Italy/France). These 
regulations have the potential to impact entrepreneurs and innovators. 
The extent of this impact remains to be seen, however. At present, this policy may have the 
following impacts: 
 The French/US models offer an opportunity for a wide range of projects to get seed 
funding (up to €1 million/$1 million). 
 The UK model offers an opportunity for companies to get seed and more 
substantial funding (up to €5 million). 
o The French/US/UK regulation may provide contributors with a wide range of 
returns. 
 The Italian model offers an opportunity for more young innovative companies (up to 
4 years old) to raise funds (up to €5 million). 
o These projects may offer similar returns to traditional forms of financing 
because professional investors may leverage crowdfunding with their 
traditional investments. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
million between 2008 and September 2014. This amount is superior to the €100 000 exemption 
amount. Note that since 2012, WiSeed operates as a licensed financial advisor thanks to a partnership 
with an already licensed financial advisor; thus WiSeed can help raise about €100 000 as an exemption 
amount. This supports the fact that without an exemption, a number of companies may not gain access 
to the desired fund through crowdfunding. 
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While each regulation may have an impact at the national level, the impact may likely ripple 
to other Member States. Member States, like the United Kingdom (167), allow foreign crowds to invest 
in their markets. 
This global movement of funds means that platforms and projects compete worldwide for 
funds. This increased competition provides incentives to platforms to perform due diligence and 
avoid attracting fraudulent projects and to fund-seekers to present the correct signals to attract 
contributors. 
This global movement of funds also means that platforms, fund-seekers, and contributors 
might be able to take advantage of the most advantageous regulations through regulatory 
arbitrage. As part of broader governance policies, crowdfunding regulations may further individual 
comparative advantages of individual Member States with regard to their innovation and start-up 
ecosystem. 
Arbitrage may be avoided. The United States provides such an example where regulations 
prevent the movements of funds and start-ups across States. The USA, as a federation of states, 
has multiple layers of regulations: and the SEC regulations at the federal level have been so 
delayed that a number of states have passed their own equity crowdfunding acts and regulatory 
exemptions (168). However, these individual efforts have limited impacts because states offering 
laws (known as ‘Blue Sky laws’) (169) require that the corporation must be incorporated within the 
state where the shares will be sold and only sell shares to residents of that state (170). Individuals 
are not likely to move to be able to invest but individuals may start their companies in the most 
favourable ecosystem. 
Differences between models exist already and may widen (171). EU Member States may 
identify different funding problems and solutions on how to use crowdfunding as Italy, France, and 
the United Kingdom have already done. For instance, these three Member States have identified 
different funding void ranges: France sees the gap at €1 000 000 while the United Kingdom and 
Italy see the gap at €5 000 000. In order to avoid further concentration of start-ups because of 
crowdfunding regulations (172), the next logical step is to raise the question of a possible 
harmonisation of crowdfunding laws and regulations at the EU level. 
                                                        
(167) The UK-based CrowdCube provides the following disclaimer: ‘The investment opportunity is not directed 
at persons located in the United States, Canada or Japan. Any person resident outside the United 
Kingdom who wishes to view these materials must first satisfy themselves that they are not subject to 
any local requirements that prohibit or restrict access.’ This disclaimer implies that investors originating 
from other countries will be able to invest — depending upon their home country’s regulations 
(http://www.crowdcube.com/) (last visited 9 September 2014). 
(168) For instance, Michigan legislature passed Public Act No  264 of 2013, House Bill No  4996, 97th 
Legislature, Regular Session of 2013 (26 December 2013) known as the ‘Michigan Invests Locally 
Exemption, which allows to raise up to one million in a 12-month period without providing audited 
documents (§ 202a (1)(c)(i)) and up to two millions in a 12-month period if the fund-seeker provides 
audited documents (§ 202a (1)(c)(ii)). Fund-seekers can access up to $10 000 from each investor (§ 202 
(1)(y)(iv)).  
(169) Securities and Exchange Commission, Crowdfunding Proposed Rules, 17 CFR, Parts 200, 227, 232, 239, 
240 and 249, pp. 323-24 (2013) (quoting the Congressional debate) [SEC Rule Interpretation 
henceforth]. The Commerce Clause combined with the Securities Act of 1933 limits how state entities 
can emit shares across state lines. 
(170) SEC Rule Interpretation pp. 322-24 (discussing Blue Sky laws — State Securities Laws — that limit 
companies formed within that state to form equity offerings to residents of that state). For instance, the 
first successful such crowdfunding efforts in Michigan involved Tecumseh Brewing Company and raised 
$175 000 from 21 investors http://www.lenaweenow.org/michigan-investment-crowdfunding-campaign-
tecumseh-brewing-success/ (last visited 8 September 2014). This constitutes the first successful 
intrastate fundraising effort. 
(171) As the Commission’s March 2014 communication pointed out, ‘[s]everal Member States have sought to 
address concerns around crowdfunding with financial return through guidelines (e.g. in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium). Others (Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Spain) are considering or have 
already taken regulatory action.’ 
(172) For further discussion on the concentration of start-ups, see the IPTS report entitled the European ICT 
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6. Future research and conclusions 
This report intended to explain the current potential and limitations of crowdfunding.  (173) 
Two conclusions, linked to potential benefits of crowdfunding mentioned in the Commission’s March 
2014 communication, seem to follow from the report. 
First, the communication mentions that crowdfunding has the potential to complement 
traditional forms of financing innovation. Whether crowdfunding fulfils this potential depends on 
the chosen regulation and the limits imposed on the different actors of crowdfunding (174). The UK 
crowdfunding model attempts to make it a complement to traditional financing whereas the Italian 
crowdfunding model seems to make it more of a substitute for seed funding of innovative 
companies. 
Second, the communication mentions that crowdfunding has the potential to act as an 
innovation-funding escalator. A study showed that about 25 % of successful campaigners raised 
additional funds from another source (venture capitalists, business angels, other companies or 
banks); however, 8 % were unsuccessful in raising more funds (175). Therefore, some projects did 
succeed in using reward crowdfunding as an escalator. 
Equity crowdfunding remains novel in that it remains to be seen whether it can be used as 
an escalator. The current set of equity crowdfunding regulations impact which innovation or 
innovative companies (176) (e.g. Italy) are able to fundraise and how much they can fundraise (e.g. 
France). Equity crowdfunding could be the boost needed to help bridge the financial gap for new 
projects or start-up companies. It could also be a way to decrease the costs for companies to obtain 
some financing. 
Whether equity crowdfunding bridges the gap may depend on some aspects of equity 
crowdfunding that remain uncertain. Future studies should focus on two of these aspects: some 
intrinsic aspects and some regulatory aspects. First, empirically investigating the following 
questions will help further understand the advantages of crowdfunding. 
 Competing finance: How does equity crowdfunding influence the rate of innovation? 
o If crowdfunding competes strongly with other sources of financing, then 
crowdfunding may reduce the cost of financing innovation but not 
necessarily improve the rate of innovation. 
o If instead crowdfunding complements other sources of financing, then 
crowdfunding may encourage innovations that would not have otherwise 
existed. 
 Direction of innovation: Will equity crowdfunding influence the direction of 
innovation? 
                                                                                                                                                                             
poles of excellence (EIPE). 
(173) On this question, DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology is financing a currently ongoing 
study entitled Crowdfunding: Regulatory framework in EU Member States and perspectives for the EU, 
SMART No 2013/0074. This study addresses crowdfunding regulations in more detail. 
(174) A study found that 15.8 % of reward crowdfunding campaigners sought prior funds from family and 
friends and 14.6 % sought prior funds from external companies. Mollick and Kuppuswamy, When firms 
are Potemkin villages: Entrepreneurs and formal organisation, Table 1 (2014). This study suggests that 
reward-based crowdfunding serves as a complement or an escalator.  
(175) Mollick and Kuppuswamy, After the campaign, Figure 1 (2014). 
(176) On this question, DG Research and Innovation is launching a study in the autumn of 2014 to assess 
empirically how crowdfunding can impact research and innovation. Horizon 2020, Work programme 
2014–15. Chapter 6: Access to risk finance, Section 9: Understanding the nature and impact of angel and 
crowd-funding in research & innovation. 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2014_2015/main/h2020-wp1415-
finance_en.pdf (last visited 9 April 2014). This study seeks to draw ‘a more comprehensive picture of the 
potential for angel and crowd-funding investors to improve access to risk finance in the EU for, in 
particular, SMEs and small midcaps, together with recommendations for action at EU, national and 
regional levels.’ 
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o If the crowd has different tastes/objectives to those of traditional financiers, 
crowdfunding will finance different type of innovations. 
 Fears of adverse selection: Does crowdfunding risk funding low quality projects or 
companies that were unsuccessful at raising money through traditional means? 
The first question deals with campaigners’ preferences and why they choose to crowdfund instead 
of using traditional means of financing. The second question deals with the investors’ preferences 
and why they choose to invest in specific projects. The third question addresses the fear that 
crowdfunding may attract projects that are bound to fail. 
 
Second, future studies should consider the regulatory impacts of equity crowdfunding: 
 licensing requirements and duty of due diligence; 
 limits on who can invest and how much they can invest; 
 limits on the company types and quantities they can raise. 
Since current regulations are very recent and only a few countries have started regulating equity 
crowdfunding, little data are available yet to allow for a cross-country comparison. But monitoring 
these regulations and empirically investigating them may help further support future regulatory 
decisions. Answering the follow questions can help better narrow efficient regulation supporting a 
successful innovation ecosystem. 
 How does each regulatory decision impact the success rate of crowdfunding 
campaigns? 
 How does each regulatory decision impact the likelihood that a campaign supports a 
fraudulent scheme? 
 How does each platform decision impact these rates as well? 
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